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 Abstract 
The European Union’s (EU) external appearance is often described as a 
‘civilian power’ (CP). However, due to increasing military capabilities and 
coercive approaches in international politics, it apparently moves towards a 
‘harder’ kind of power. Applying a role-theoretical approach, the study explores 
what kind of power the EU actually constitutes and thus studies whether the EU’s 
characterization as a CP is still empirically valid. In order to do so, the work takes 
into account two parts of a role-conception: the self-perception of the EU and the 
view of how the non-EU ‘others’ perceive it. Hereby, the Union’s self-perception 
is investigated by means of qualitative text-analysis of central EU-documents. The 
perception of ‘others’ is studied with the aid of a self-conducted expert-survey. 
The result of this approach is ambivalent. The EU still constructs itself as a CP, 
but is aware of the increasingly use of coercive and military means. The 
perception ‘from outside’ reflects the EU’s harder approaches in the international 
arena, but clearly does not perceive it as a predominately military actor. Thus, the 
labelling of the EU as a CP is not suitable anymore; instead it constitutes an actor 
shifting away from the ‘civilian ideal’. 
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 1 Introduction 
“We started off as a peace project, and in many ways that is still what we are 
today: from building peace in Europe to peacebuilder around the world”  
               (Solana 2007a) 
 
In her speech regarding to the 50th anniversary of the European Union1, 
respectively the Treaty of Rome, the President of the European Council 2007, 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel, emphasised that the Union will continue to 
peacefully contribute to conflict resolution (Merkel 2007). Moreover, the 
solemnly adopted ‘Berlin Declaration’, which displays a kind of guideline for the 
contemporary Union, implies Europe’s unique role to promote freedom and 
democracy to the world in a peaceful way (Berlin Declaration). These two 
examples display a distinctive characterization of Europe as a project that is 
committed to peace due to its warlike past. Such a perception is widely spread 
among the decision makers in Brussels, the media and the academia (Prodi 2000, 
Kaldor 2007). Moreover, the EU is often seen as an adequate answer to new 
challenges of the post cold-war order due to cooperation, common institutions, 
and its strive for multi-lateral approaches in international politics. The peaceful 
integration process and the intense interaction between the member-states may 
even serve as a model for other states to overcome their conflicts. According to 
this perspective, it is due to its historical heritage, the political willingness of the 
member-states, and the lack of capability, which made it necessary that “the EU 
has been committed to contributing to international peace and security by soft, 
non-military means” (Björkdahl 2007: 1). Externalizing the values that guide the 
Union’s internal relations like peaceful conflict resolution, negotiation, 
democracy, the rule of law and the difussion human rights2 thus means pursuing 
to exercise a new kind of irenic power. Finally concluding the abovementioned, 
the European Union is distinct “in the setup and character of goals and values 
[and] in the configuration of political instruments used” (Elgström and Smith 
2006: 2). The EU thus feels obliged to the purpose of a civilisation of policy and 
acts accordingly. In this sense, it can be understood as a ‘Normative’ or a 
‘Civilian Power’ (Manners 2002; Maull 2006:2).  
However, the recently developments since the establishment of a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a subordinated European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) also show another picture of the Union. The EU 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 European Union will often be abbreviated as EU, Union or simply Europe. 
2 Manners (2002: 242-43) recognizes seven distinctive values – he calls it the ‘normative basis’- that characterize 
the EU. 
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 apparently gets prepared for armed conflicts after its grand failure on the Balkans: 
The military capabilities today encompass 60,000 troops, comprise the Battle 
Group concept and the Rapid Reaction Corps and hence demonstrates a new 
willingness to deal with hard power (Björkdahl 2007: 2). The fourteen military 
and civilian missions that the Union launched since 2003 from Concordia in the 
former Yougoslavic Republic of Macedonia (2003) to the planned operation in 
Kosovo (to be conducted in summer 2007) could be perceived as examples for a 
new ‘military Europe’. In fact, the emerging militarization poses questions about 
the EU’s abovementioned unique and civilian external appearance. In terms of 
Kagan (2002), it seems that the weak ‘Venus Europe’ is disposed to become a 
‘marsian warrior’.   
Parts of the actual literature on the Europeans power in the world summarize 
these points by stating that the EU constitutes an actor that is ‘civilian’ or 
‘normative’ by virtue of its tradition and history (Matlary 2006, Manners 2002). 
Simultaneously, however, it is emphasised that the EU “has built up considerable 
capacity in the military field over recent years, and this has been deployed in 
various missions” (Matlary 2006: 107). 
This academic discussion, whether the EU is rather to be characterized as a 
military power (in the making) or a civilian power, serves as a point of departure 
for the following research questions.  
1.1 Research questions and the objective of the study 
In 2005, political science scholars Hill and Smith concluded in their textbook 
International Relations and the European Union that the EU is currently facing a 
dilemma according to its external policy (2005: 403). In this sense, they posed the 
question whether the Union should “attempt to develop its capabilities according 
to conventional definitions of power, including the military element, when this 
might put at risk the very (irenic) values which Europe has come to stand for in 
international relations?”. The study aims to explore if this is the case. The crucial 
and pervading question, however, will be ‘what kind of power’ the contemporary 
EU displays? Is the following excerpt a fact? 
 
“It [i.e. the EU] clearly has a significant global presence and a »Mister Nice Guy« image in 
international relations on account of its devout multilateralism and its traditionally non-
coercive approach to its external relations. This image is encouraged both by EU actions 
frequently reflecting its principles and by comparison with other leading powers, notably the 
US.” (Marsh and Mackenstein 2005: 251). 
 
Consequently, the present paper tries to shed light on whether the Union is 
developing towards a military power, or does it display a ‘true’ civilian power?  
The subject that will be tried to resolve subsequently, is whether there exists a 
gap between the European self-identity and its current behaviour, but also what 
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 difference between the EU and the perception of ‘receivers’ of EU power (and 
‘others’ in general) can be observed?  
The goal of this study will be to contribute to the academic discussion of 
‘Civilian Power Europe’ (CPE) and come up with a new approach that empirically 
includes the perception of ‘others’. This is assumed to be crucial due to the 
applied conception of CPE which implies both how the EU constructs itself (ego 
part) and how it is externally perceived (alter part) (Burckhardt 2004: 17). To the 
author’s knowledge, no scholar has yet scrutinized the concept of CPE completely 
by taking into account the external perception of the international environment, 
although there is a demand “of probing what expectations and images actors 
outside the Union have of EU foreign policy” (Chaban et. al. 2006: 245). Thus, 
this thesis aims to contribute somewhat to this rather unexplored area with an 
empirical investigation of EU’s actual role conception. 
Furthermore, the paper wants to illuminate the rather foggy conception of CPE 
and aims to propose a suitable characterization of the actual role of the European 
Unions external identity. 
1.2 Theory: Civilian Power Europe you are 
surrounded 
Every thorough analysis needs a reflexive theory and perspective that structures 
all observations. Besides, a statement or finding of a social phenomenon is 
impossible to make in a theoretical vacuum.  
Hence, to gradually approach the research question and answer it, I will utilize 
a certain theoretical framework. I will subsume three theoretical ‘stages’ or 
‘dimensions’ to explain the conceptual design of this work. These stages grasp a 
broad, meta-theoretical approach (social constructivism), over to the perspective 
of the EU as a power to finally conclude with substantial role-theory. This is 
regarded as an attempt to orbit the issue of this work and to hopefully come to a 
valid and reliable result. 
This present study embraces the research problem of the EU’s (possible) being 
as a civilian power with help of  “the burgeoning school of thought known as 
»constructivism«” (Andretta 2005: 31). This approach is to be seen as the meta-
theoretical fundament of this paper.  The expectation is that this theory will 
facilitate a fruitful examination of the values, role and perceptions of the 
European Union’s foreign and security policies. Hence, social constructivism 
shall prepare ground for the subsequent portrayed methods and role theory. In 
International Relations (IR) the core element of constructivism is the social 
construction of reality. Besides, social constructivism is “unified by a common 
concern with how ideas define the international structure that constructs the 
identities, interests, and foreign policy practices (…)” (Barnett 2005: 252).  
In general, there is no universal valid reality but perception. Perception, 
however, is a human construction. As Barnett puts it “the social construction of 
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 reality concerns not only how we see the world, but also how we see ourselves, 
define our interests, and determine what constitutes acceptable action” (Barnett 
2005: 259). The self-perception of the European Union, thus its ideas and values 
are expressed in speeches and official documents about the European Union’s 
external manifestation. More precisely, the author’s hypothesis is that in speeches 
and in EU key documents on its external relations, a set of self-perception will be 
provided (cf. 1.4).   
According to Hill and Smith (2005: 7-13), there are three distinct perspectives 
on International Relations and the EU. Firstly, the EU seen as a sub-system of IR, 
secondly, the Union as a part of the wider processes of international relations, and 
finally, the EU as a power, impacting upon contemporary international relations. 
The study will adopt the very latter perspective, since it can be usefully applied to 
“assess the extent to which the EU shapes its external environment, [and] is 
perceived by other actors as so doing” (ibid.: 7). Also, this perspective emphasizes 
the importance of a “European »presence«, or more a European »identity«” 
(Andreatta 2005: 35). Consequently, this perspective enables to scrutinize the 
topic with help of role-theory. 
The concept of role theory finally picks up the idea of self-perception, but 
broadens it with the views of how outsiders3 (‘others’) see this specific identity4. 
The perspective encompasses the assumption that the EU’s role includes two 
parts. The first part is an internalization of a self-perception and the second part 
constitutes an internalization of ‘others’ expectations. The central assumption is 
that “others’ views on the EU help to shape identity and roles” (Chaban, 
Elgström, Holland 2006: 247). Hence, foreign policy roles are formed through 
“continuous interactions between own role conceptions and structurally based 
expectations” (ibid.; cf. Dembinsky 2002: I, 20-21). Role-theory is perceived as 
“the leading explanation of why Europe is a Civilian Power” (Burckhardt 2004: 
16) and could therefore establish an appropriate basis to analyse the issue. The 
thesis mainly applies the ideas of political scientist Hanns Maull (2006). 
Roles are essentially conceptualized as “patterns of expected behaviour” 
(Elgström & Smith 2006, cf. Kirste & Maull 1996). More tangibly, role-theory 
provides this study with the idea of role conception5 defined as “actors’ self 
images and the effects of others’ role expectations” (Elgström & Smith 2006: 6). 
This concept enables to scrutinize how an actor is constructing itself in the 
international arena (ego-part). Moreover, it allows taking systematically into 
consideration the expectations of other actors (alter-part) (Maull 2006: 3-4). Both 
ego and alter-part shape twofold role-conception which thus outlines a coherent 
approach to the study’s topic (ibid.; Burckhardt 2004: 17; Dembinski 2002: I). In 
general, role perceptions are assumed to be reflected in the behaviour of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 The ‘others’ or outsiders refer to non-EU (state-)actors in international relations. 
4 Sometimes, self-perception is referred to identity in this study. This is done to gain some variety in the diction. 
The author is well aware that self-perception and identity constitute two different approaches. 
5 The difference between roles and role conceptions is that the latter is long-lasting while roles can cahnge more 
rapidly (Kirste & Maull 1996). 
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 foreign policy EU decision-makers (and inverted) (Harnisch 2000: 3, Kirste & 
Maull 1996). 
1.3 Method 
The paper assumes that the EU is an “inward-looking and self-referential (…) 
community that constitutes itself not only by institutions and processes but by 
discourses within it” (Hill and Smith 2005: 12). Sources of role-
conceptualisations are assumed to be anchored in these discourses and the 
perception of others (Mitzen 2006: 271).  
Keeping that in mind, the study tries to ‘get a grip’ on the discourse about 
Europe as a civilian power6. According to Esaiasson et. al. (2003: 18) this can be 
achieved with the help of a suitable set of tools, consisting of a) empirical 
knowledge (which already exists); b) earlier applied set of methods; and, c) 
maybe, normative discussions about how the discourse should be. 
For the most part, the study will alter and process suggestions of Hanns 
Maull’s analytical dimensions of Civilian Power (Maull 2006). This concept 
comprises the implementation of the perception of ‘others’ to come up with a 
complete role-conception. He proposes a four-fold examination of the CPE 
model: 
 
Explicitly, he suggests an empirical evaluation of the foreign policy self-
perception provided by a) decision-makers, b) elites and c) citizens. This 
examination will be performed by an exploration of aa) foreign-policy principle 
documents, bb) qualitative interviews and cc) survey data. Finally, the empirical 
findings shall be compared to a conceptualized ideal-type of Civilian Power. 
The present paper, however, will modify some points of Maull’s suggestions 
by narrowing his concept. For the first, it will reverse Maull’s suggestion by 
initially developing an expanded ideal-type of CPE on basis of existing literature. 
The second modification the author conducted in Maull’s methodological 
framework only takes into account the two first actor-variables (a) and b)) and the 
matching analytical methods (aa) bb))7. This proceeding is due to the fact that, 
regarding to the issue, vast public opinion-polls are quite rare and inaccessible. As 
already mentioned (1.3), the work conceptualizes role-theory. To summarize, this 
rather elite-focussed and slender methodological approach is supposed to be well 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6 However, as Esaiasson et. al. accurately note (2003: 18), it is impossible to draw up a whole discourse in an 
undergraduate thesis.  
7 Actually, the methodological category of interviews has been transferred into an expert-survey. This further 
modification suits into the category of interview according to Lundahl and Skärvad (1992). The motivation 
behind this, however, was the assumption that an expert-survey would come to similar valid results as an 
interview.     
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 equipped to give substantial and comprehensible answers to the research 
question(s).  
To examine the abovementioned key-documents and speeches, the proceeding 
of this work is a qualitative text analysis. This contains thorough reading and 
interpretation of whole texts and specific parts along with scrutinizing the text-
content. The reason for picking this method is that it enables to reveal a certain 
text-content and intention that is hidden at first sight. Furthermore, this method 
allows to consider secondary literature of scholars in the field of CPE, which thus 
provides a useful help to link on the current discourse (Esaiasson et. al. 2003: 
233). 
A self-designed expert-survey finally complements the methodological 
toolbox. The survey has been conducted with stakeholders at Missions to the EU 
and at the related embassies in Sweden8. It was sent out by both e-mail and fax in 
April/ May 2007. The reason for choosing these electronic methods is mainly due 
to the possibility of a quick response. Basis and background of the survey is the 
here proposed definition of CPE. This definition was split into different items and 
then tested empirically. The selection of third countries that were asked to answer 
the survey was based on those countries where the EU is or was conducting 
civilian or militarily supported operations. The intention behind this choice was 
the assumption that those countries are very suitable since they are/were directly 
influenced of EU power. Experts chosen to answer the questions were all 
diplomatic personnel (like ambassadors or political attachés) since they are 
considered to reflect their governments’ (therewith the ‘others’) perceptions of the 
EU in world affairs (Chaban et. al. 2006: 248). According to Maull diplomats are 
a suitable clientele to interview since they can be considered as role bearers9 
(Kirste and Maull 1996). The survey has been sent out to foreign policy 
representatives from ten countries10. Seven responses have been received. Since 
the survey was sent to diplomatic mission in Brussels and Sweden, the rate of 
return was 35 %. This is a common rate and thus builds a valid empirical basis 
(Ray 1999). The survey’s design consisted of eleven multiple-choice questions 
and the recipients had been assured to remain anonymous. Moreover, the survey 
was sent to EU-delegations in those countries where the EU is/ was carrying out 
operations. Aside from this, the Office of the High Representative for the CFSP, 
Javier Solana, was asked to response. This was done to get an empirical indication 
of the self-image provided by the analysis of the key-documents and to test the 
hypothesis whether the European Union still considers itself as a Civilian Power. 
Insofar, the empirical survey also reflected the role-theoretical approach to 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
8 I explicitly want to thank Annika Björkdahl for helping me designing and conducting the survey. Thanks also 
to the thesis seminar, especially Arian Ratkoceri and Tina Kolhammar for discussing it. Last but not least, thanks 
to Kristina Gröndahl-Nilsson who provided and assisted me with the fax machine at the department.  
9 The original citation is „Zum anderen üben Staaten durch eine Vielzahl staatlicher Repräsentanten als einzelne 
Rollenträger (z.B. Diplomaten in verschiedenen Beziehungsrahmen an verschiedenen Orten) selbstverständlich 
mehrere Rollen gleichzeitig und nebeneinander aus“. The author translated „Rollenträger“ to role bearers.  
10 The survey was initially sent to Missions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Indonesia, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Macedonia, Palestine, Ukraine, Moldova, Iraq, Georgia and Sudan. 
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 consider both alter and ego-part. Four responses (N= 4) of EU-delegations had 
been sent back forming a sufficient background of analysis. Moreover, the office 
of the Javier Solana sent back its response displaying the general view from 
Brussels.  
In general, it is expected that the main features of a role-conception will be 
reflected in these surveys11. To provide transparency of the approach, the survey 
and its results are attached to the appendix.  
1.4 Material 
The work scrutinizes both primary and secondary material. The primary sources 
consist of official EU material related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), which is regarded as of importance for the concept of CPE. The 
motivation to occupy myself with the CFSP is that it can be shown most clearly of 
whether the EU is developing towards something different from a Civilian Power 
or not. Furthermore, the source-material is in large part chronologically limited 
from 2003 until today (May 2007). The reason for this is that the CFSP is a quite 
new phenomenon and characterized by rapid changes, so that the detailed 
examination of older material could be of less actual importance. However, some 
documents before 2003 will be considered. This is due to the very essential 
importance of a few papers or speeches that still build a frame of reference for the 
EU’s foreign and security policy. Concretely, the European Security Strategy 
(ESS), several speeches and articles of the High Representative for the CFSP, 
whitepapers, treaties and statements along with speeches of the actual EU-
Commissioner for Integration will be scrutinized. The other part of primary 
material is the above described written expert-survey (cf. 1.3).  
Concerning the secondary material, the work draws on books and articles of 
relevant authors. They have been consulted to contribute and to assess the 
discourse on CPE. Besides, they supplied the paper with a scientific background 
and enabled to develop a framework of analysis. 
It is however worth mentioning that the availability and accessibility of the 
used material is very imbalanced. While the flow of primary sources concerning 
the self-perception of the EU is almost unstoppable and also easily to access on 
the web spaces of the EU, primary material  that relates to the others’ perception 
is like finding a needle in a haystack12. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
11 Harnisch (2000: 3) underpins this argument:  „Die ‚außenpolitische Rolle’ wirkt mithin als Prisma für externe 
und interne, materielle und immaterielle Faktoren, die sich über die Rollenperzeption der außenpolitischen Elite 
in Verhalten niederschlägt“ 
12 Thanks to Ole Elgström who provided me with some ‘rare material’ 
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 1.5 Criticism of Method and Material: A fly in the 
ointment? 
Since the understanding and conceptualization of EU’s “global role and 
international identity is a highly controversial research issue” (Télio 2007: 2), the 
author is well aware that the methodological proceeding of this study will not be 
shared by every reader. Of course, other ways to come to terms with the CPE 
issue can be found. However, this small chapter cannot shoulder to analyse all 
divergent theoretical and methodological views on CPE which exist (see e.g. 
Burckhardt 2004: 13-21; Harnisch 2000: 21-31, Harnisch 1997). Thus, it only 
takes into consideration some salient criticisms that could emerge.  
One interesting approach e.g. is centred on the main constituents of the 
European Union, namely the member states. Lisbeth Aggestam (2006) argues in 
her study on the security and defence role of the EU to consider the EU-3 – 
Germany, France and Britain – when exploring the international behaviour of the 
EU. This is because the ‘Three’ are perceived as key actors and driving forces of 
the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), each with 
distinctive approaches to the ESDP. This approach underpins the claim that “as 
the CFSP remains intergovernmental, the perspective of the Member States is 
arguably more important than that of the European institutions” (Burckhardt 2004: 
19). Her proceeding is to examine mostly primary material related to the EU-3, 
like political speeches and documents along with interviews of representatives. 
Her finding is that “the extent to which their views converge or diverge will have 
a decisive influence of the future effectiveness of the ESDP” (Aggestam 2006: 6). 
To summarize, this approach can add value to the discussion of CPE, but the 
exploration of EU-originated material is supposed to be more suitable for the here 
discussed concern. This is due to the assumption that this material reflects a 
collectively negotiated result, while the examination of member-states related 
material is rather of importance for the development of CPE related EU-policies. 
However, for a post-graduate thesis both approaches would build an excellent and 
comprehensive analytical framework13.  
Finally, one could consider the proposed framework as too elite-centric, not 
taking into account the perceptions of the European citizens. Moreover, the 
method of conducting a survey instead of face-to-face in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders could be criticised. However, these approaches are methodologically 
difficult and financially unfeasible for the author. The bulk of available ( Eurostat, 
‘Eurobarometer’) public-opinion data is useless for the study since it hardly 
comprehends issues regarding to CPE. Face-to-face interviews could not be 
conducted since they would consume too much time. Several telephone interviews 
attempts were made but the potential respondents found that the issue was too 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
13 With respect to the limited time and space the author is aware that a comprehensive attempt in a size proposed 
above is impossible to conduct in a Bachelor’s thesis. 
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 complex to talk over telephone. In general, it is also not easy to access high state-
representatives. Apart from these legitimate criticisms, the framework is 
considered to be solid enough to carry CPE due to its advantage to present a 
concise scientific finding through the elaborated theories and methods. Briefly, in 
the authors opinion, CPE is dominantly an academic topic, thus it is elitist by 
design14. Moreover, CPE can best be analysed through mutually negotiated 
official EU-papers and speeches that reflect a sort of common-sense in the Union. 
Last but not least the implementation of an expert-survey may differ from a face 
to-face interview approach, but will also result in valid empirical data.  
1.6 Outline of the Study 
First, the paper will start of with an exploration of the literature that has been 
written on the topic of CPE. This will be done to tie up with the related discourse 
and to examine where the study can be of help for actual research. Second, on 
basis of the secondary literature, an ideal-type of definition of CPE will be 
developed. This definition will enable us to scrutinize and assess the EU’s 
external policy. Third, EU-key documents will be analysed and further build a 
corset of the European self-perception. Fourth, we will examine how ‘the others’ 
perceive the EU in world politics. We will then conclude the self-perception and 
the other’s perspective of Europe. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
14Of course, this does not mean that it will stay a solely academic issue in the future. Particularly with regards to 
the frequently political polemic about CPE, it can already be seen as part of a limited public debate. 
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 2 The debate of CPE – Thirty years 
and still no consensus  
“For these reasons there must be a league of a particular kind, which can be 
called a league of peace (foedus pacificum), and which would be distinguished 
from a treaty of peace (pactum pacis) by the fact that the latter terminates only 
one war, while the former seeks to make an end of all wars forever” (Immanuel 
Kant 1795) 
 
This chapter presents an initial point for the following sections. Since the 
discourse of CPE has lasted for over thirty years, it is essential for the proceeding 
of the study to tie on the most important developments in the debate to evaluate 
the research questions.  
Recently, instead of the perception that the debate about CPE “definitely 
seems to be a thing of the past” (Gnesetto cited in Smith 2005: 1), a revival of 
CPE emerged15 (ibid., Orbie: 126). The reason for this is probably rooted in the 
developments of EU’s ESDP operations in Europe and the world, where the 
(partly) utilization of military means caused a fundamental re-thinking of the 
Civilian Power idea. Hence, a short, general overview of the academic CPE 
discourse will provide us with a critical background.  
In the wake of the beginnings of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 
early 1970’s, the EU was considered as a unique external actor. Apart from the 
never ending discussion on what the EU really is – an actor sui generis, less than a 
state but more than an international organization16-, it is striking that the EU 
developed a (more or less coherent) external appearance. In large parts of the 
academic literature, the outcome of that role in the world is characterized as an 
answer of the new international reality consisting of interdependence and new 
global challenges (Dembinsky 2002, McCormick 2007, Louis 2007). In this 
perspective, instead of seeking its short-term advantage and using ‘old-fashioned’ 
military coercion, the EU stands for a concept of regulating relations with help of 
international law, rules, and norms. Moreover, the EU is described as a new 
Kantian foedus pacificum in international relations which constitutes peaceful 
relations between its member states and serves an example for non-violent coping 
of global issues. In other words, the Union is described as ‘civilian power’ 
(Dembinski: I). 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
15 This renaissance results e.g. in a special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy (13:2, March 2006) 
which dedicates some hundred pages to the idea of CPE and its recent developments. 
16 Significantly, McCormick remarks that “we do not even yet have a noun to describe the EU” (2007: 15). 
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Since François Duchêne, ‘founding father’ of CPE, initially presented the 
notion in an article 1972, the debate of CPE has fascinated scholars and lasted for 
over thirty years. Duchêne’s work comprised both descriptive features (e.g. 
observation of raising importance of interdependence and transnationalism) and 
normative elements (domestication of interstate relations regionally and globally) 
(Maull 2005: 779). Both elements are still to be found in the current CPE concepts 
and cause an intermingling of descriptive and normative (Burckhardt: 21-33). 
Concretely, by relating to the EPC, Duchêne stated that lack of military power 
is not the handicap in international relations that it once was, and that Western 
Europe might become the first civilian centre of power (McCormick 2007: 27-28). 
He predicted the early 70ies EC as an upcoming area where the “old-aged process 
of war and indirect violence could be translated” to a modern “twentieth-century 
citizen’s notion of civilized politics” (cited in McCormick: 28). Consequently, he 
outlined ‘civilian power’ as “long on economic power and relatively short on 
military force” (ibid.). Western Europe, he argued, should remain true to its very 
characteristics, that are civilian ends and means. It should ‘domesticate’ and 
spread its civilian and democratic standards as a becoming cohesive international 
actor. Simultaneously, he stated that Europe will not build up its military capacity 
in order to become an unbiased mediator between the superpowers (ibid.: 69-70). 
His perception was that modern security policies more and more consisted “in 
shaping the international milieu often in areas which at first sight have little to do 
with security” (cited in Hyde-Price 2004: 4). The European Community simply 
was a different kind of actor in relation to the two existing superpowers. However, 
the pioneering approach Duchêne’s was not developed as comprehensive scheme, 
instead it is striking for its unsystematic manner (Orbie: 123, Maull 2005: 779). 
This vagueness is also the reason why CPE allows different interpretations by 
academics and policy makers. “The enduring resonance of the CPE role” remains 
“because of, rather than in spite of, [Duchêne’s] rather imprecise description” 
(Orbie: 124).  
These diverse readings of the CPE notion reflect furthermore a discursive 
struggle that is characterized by a two-fold ‘rift’. Burckhardt (2004) identifies the 
first rift within the concept of CPE as the unsolved question whether a Civilian 
Power may use force. The second rift relates to the contested origins of CPE. 
Nevertheless, the first rift is considered as the most important one, giving us 
insights in the CPE’s different conceptions and thus will be elaborated here, while 
the second rift will not be a case of examination. This is due to the assumption 
that the study of the second rift does not very much contribute to the research-
question. The observation of the first rift, however, is perceived as a suitable 
explanation for the discursive dissensions. Therefore, this paper in large part 
follows Burkhardt’s argumentation, but also synthesizes his work with Orbie’s 
(2006) fine review on the CPE debate. Indeed, a lot of links between the both 
authors’ remarks can be found.  
Orbie (2006: 124) classifies three important authors, “founding fathers” in his 
words, which he allocates to different schools of IR. He consequently suborders 
Duchêne to the ‘pluralist’ school, while Johan Galtung’s account of a European 
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 capitalist superpower (The European Community: A Superpower in the making), 
elaborated 1973, is seen as ‘structuralist’. Both are contesting the ‘realist’ or 
‘Gaulist’ approach of l’Europe puissance. In this context, Hedley Bull’s 
contemptuous, realist crititique of Duchêne’s idea must be mentioned, which he 
labelled as a ‘contradiction terms’. His characterization was that EU military 
integration is desirable but infeasible (ibid.). Moreover, he argued that the 
capabilities of great powers have to be defined by their military resources. Only 
with military capabilities there could be a European actorness (Whitman 2006: 
103). During the 1980’s this perspective was uncritically shared, hence, fell on 
fertile ground and exemplified the “rising dominance of realist approaches” 
(ibid.). Bull’s criticism “reassembles Kagan’s (2002) famous account on Europe 
as a ‘Kantian paradise’” (ibid.). Though, Galtung’s analysis also has actual 
significance, since it is applied by the globalization critical movement, 
questioning the EU’s trade policy.  
However, within the ‘pluralist’ approaches the CPE concept is further 
elaborated but scattered. By whether emphasizing the foreign policy means or 
ends, the differences arise. In this context, a “fierce debate” (ibid.: 125) whether 
military means are compatible with the CPE concept arose. Burckhardt (2004: 9-
13) notices two competing discourses. The dominant discourse claims that a 
“Civilian Power can use force, even though the exact conditions remain 
contested” (Burckhardt: 9). The competing discourse comprises that a CPE by 
definition cannot employ military means.  
In favour for the first mentioned understanding is the plain remark that 
Civilian Power Europe implies the term ’Power’ which obviously refers to “a 
punitive sense of power” (ibid.). The vision of a European pacifist utopia is 
apparently not covered by CPE. Otherwise, as Burckhardt stresses “one could 
have left out the word altogether: a Civilian Europe would have been more 
fitting” (ibid.). The dominant discourse thus sees a defence capacity transforming 
the EU from a civilian power ‘by default’ (making a virtue out of necessity) to a 
civilian power ‘by design’ (Orbie: 125, Stavridis 2001, Larsen 2002: 292). 
However, military means must always be subordinate to civilian approaches of 
conflict management and only employed as an ultima ratio. This view clearly is in 
line with an original sense of self-defence in international politics. Duchêne 
himself argues that military integration in conjunction with self-defence would be 
compatible with his idea of Europe as a Civilian Power (ibid., Burckhardt: 10). 
However, a clear definition to what extent and under which circumstances a CPE 
is allowed to use force is not tangible. Burckhardt comments that the pro military 
integration strand is focussing more on the ends than the means of EU’s foreign 
policy (ibid.: 10). At the same time argues another fraction that the discussion of 
ends “was long overshadowed” (Orbie: 125) by the debate on means.  
A competing discourse, which constitutes the ‘counterpart’ of the first ‘rift’ 
discussed above, perceives the CPE’s use of force differently. The military 
integration collides with the role of a Civilian Power. ‘Power’, in this line of 
reasoning, is interpreted as ideological and remunerative types of power, instead 
of pure force (Burckhardt: 12). Hence, the advocates of this perspective 
emphasize non-military and peaceful foreign policy, since  
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[...] the stated intention of enhancing the EU’s military resources carries a price: it sends a 
signal that military force is still useful and necessary, and that it should be used to further the 
EU’s interests. It would close off the path of fully embracing civilian power. And this means 
giving up far too much for far too little. (Smith, K.E cited in Orbie: 125) 
 
In other words, the extensive use of military means reverses the peaceful 
‘magnetic force’ of a CPE. In the end, the attraction to other actors will get lost 
and Europe would be distracted “from its comparative advantage in the non-
miliary sphere” (Orbie:125). Moreover, third parties would perceive “such a 
development as a step toward the creation of a superpower” that uses force to 
“pursue its own interests” (Burckhardt: 12). As consequence, a security dilemma 
is imaginable with neighbouring regions. Authors favouring a non-military CPE 
are concerned whether a militarily integrated Europe is compatible with one 
crucial idea of CPE, that is the reversal of the balance of power logic in the ‘old 
Europe’ (ibid.). Another anxiety is the engagement in peacemaking operations. 
This is because the credibility of CPE as a promoter of worldwide legitimate 
governance could be damaged since humanitarian military interventions are only 
conductible in countries that are by far weaker than the intervening state. This 
could then led to an “’intervention à la carte’” (ibid.). However, European states 
could cooperate in defence, albeit not in connection to the EU as a whole. One 
solution is a direct engagement of single member-states in UN missions (Orbie: 
125). 
When taking a look at the works emphasizing the ends of CPE, the notion of 
Europe as a ‘normative power’ arose. Ian Manners (2002) shaped this notion in an 
often-cited article by underlining the promotion of internalized values through the 
EU. He relates to Galtung, but foremost to Duchêne and his notion of an idée 
force: “[Europe] must be a force for the international diffusion of civilian and 
democratic standards” (cited in Orbie: 126). By promoting its inner characteristics 
or its “normative basis”, Europe has the “ability to shape conceptions of »normal« 
in international relations” (Manners: 239-40). This basis is to be found in 
Europe’s “historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitution” 
(Manners: 240), which further “accelerated a commitment to placing universal 
norms and principles at the centre of its [i.e. EU’s] relation with its Member States 
and the world” (ibid.: 241). This logic is recently followed by many other scholars 
that emphasize EU’s value-driven and normative external appearance. It is 
perceived as the main distinctness of the Union as an international actor (Orbie: 
126). Noteworthy in this context is that recently published works including 
‘normative power’ neglect the close linkage to Civilian Power. However, the 
present work considers ‘normative power’, as proposed in this chapter (and by 
Orbie), as part of CPE and thus subordinates it under this concept. Other notions 
like the ones of Europe as a ‘civilizing’ or ‘ethical’ power as well are considered 
to be absorbed by the category of CPE (Sjursen 2006). 
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 3 The difficulty of developing an Ideal 
Type CPE definition 
Without a basic background of the notion “the analytical use of a Civilian Power 
Europe is limited” (Burckhardt: 33). Now that we have been provided with this 
background, we can use that knowledge to find a suitable definition for CPE that 
would fit in the presented framework. However, due to the abovementioned 
vagueness and indistinctness of the Civilian Power Europe concept, a tangible 
definition does hardly exist. Many scholars complain about this fact and advocate 
for an actual, well-elaborated ideal type definition that is needed for future 
research on CPE (Orbie: 126; K.E. Smith 2005; Burckhardt: 32). We will 
therefore try to come up with such a definition with means of different authors’ 
conceptions. In order to do so, this paper mainly draws on the definition provided 
by K.E. Smith (2005: 1-6). She outlines her classification with help of 
circumscribing it to the opposed model of a military power. With both ‘poles’ on 
each side (military on the one, and civilian on the other), this model enables the 
researcher to place his empirical observations on this dynamic ‘measuring stick’. 
The present paper adopts this formidable invention but modifies it with some few 
elements of Maull’s work (2006: 2; 2005: 779-83; Kirste & Maull 1996). It 
hereby follows Burckhardt’s suggestion that adopting Maull’s “German Civilian 
Power school” along with the studies of scholars concerned with EU foreign 
Policy would be promising (Burckhardt: 33). However, the provided ideal type 
definition does surely not claim to be ‘state of the art’. 
 It is crucial to imply Duchêne’s idea of the Union’s strength and novelty as an 
international actor that is rooted in its capability to extend (or domesticate) its 
model of security and stability with economic and political rather than military 
means. This notion builds the background for new conceptualizations of Civilian 
Power.  
By means of a Weberian Ideal Type of Civilian Power Maull attempted to turn 
Duchêne’s unstructured notion in an analytical tool for foreign policy analysis. In 
his early work on Civilian Power, he merely applied it to analyse (West) 
Germany’s and Japan’s external appearance in the 1990s. Later, he clearly stated 
that his model is not merely applicable to states, but also to the chimera EU 
(Maull 2006: 2). According to Maull, a Civilian Power concentrates mainly on 
non-military, economic means to achieve its objectives, emphasizes multilateral 
cooperation (rather than conflict), develops supranational structures to cope with 
international problems, and, importantly, leaves “the military as a residual 
safeguard” (McCormick: 70). Karin E. Smith picks up Maull’s idea of an ideal-
type but further elaborates his model. Indeed, her definition is an advanced 
attempt as she not only accounts for the two crucial elements of CPE, namely 
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 means and ends. She moreover adds the central features of how these means are 
used, and the process by which foreign policy is made (K.E. Smith 2005: 2). In 
sum, she merges four criteria to a CPE: 1.) means: using non-military instruments 
(like economic, diplomatic and political) to achieve goals; 2.) ends: preference for 
international cooperation, solidarity, responsibility for global environment, 
diffusion of equality, justice and tolerance along with international regimentation 
with help of law 3.) the use of persuasion; and 4.) “democratic civilian control 
over foreign and defence policymaking” (McCormick: 70). While all four 
elements matter, Smith admits that “the line between what constitutes civilian and 
what does not” in the latter three features “is much harder to determine than in the 
first one” (Smith: 2). The first one, however, seems to be simply outlined. Civilian 
means are non-military and therewith economic, diplomatic, and cultural means, 
whereas military means comprises the armed use of force. However, this is the 
point where the here proposed definition inclines to adopt Maull’s viewpoint on 
military force and civilian power (Maull 2005: 779-82). A civilian power can still 
be civilian no matter if it has armed forces at its disposal. In Maull’s words (2005: 
780): “This is why they are called ‘civilian powers’ – not because military power 
is irrelevant to what they are trying to achieve”. Otherwise, we could simply state 
that the EU, of course, is not a Civilian Power anymore due to its achievements in 
the ESDP and conclude the study at this point17. Rather, the present study 
suggests that military forces can be considered as civilian means if they serve for 
purposes of collective self-defence, or collective security and effective peace-
keeping. What is significant accordingly –and here we anticipate the third of 
Smith’s elements- is the way how these means are used (see below). Military 
force can only be used collectively and with international legitimacy, and solely to 
pursue to civilize international relations (Maull 2005: 781). However, we must 
admit that this distinction may make the definition fuzzier since it depends on the 
scholars perception what ‘civilizing international relations’ (pursuing civilian 
ends) and ‘legitimacy’ means18.  
When coming to terms with civilian ends, Smith outlines that the 
characteristics mentioned above, like the preference for international cooperation, 
can be described in Wolfers’ categorization as ‘milieu goals’ rather than 
‘possession goals’ (K.E. Smith: 3). Whereas possession goals pursue national 
interests (in terms of EU: self-interests), primarily in security matters, milieu 
goals “aim to shape the environment in which the actor operates” (Elgström and 
Smith: 2). Hence, a Civilian Power represents something different from other 
powers in the international system since it is not an actor that is primarily driven 
by its self-interests. The observation, however, was made that this statement is 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
17 K. Smith notes that states that have military forces, even neutral ones like Austria and Switzerland are no 
“pure civilian powers, because they have military forces” (K. Smith: 6). The author asses this perspective as 
oversimplified and therefore dare the step to make our definition more complex. 
18 The question immediately emerging is whether the operation in Yugoslavia in the 1990s was legitimate or not. 
Maull admits that concerning the intervention in Yugoslavia the criteria of full international legitimacy were not 
fulfilled since it had no UN mandate. He also refutes the exception of singleness, since such interventions cannot 
be ruled out in the future (Burckhardt: 11).  
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 rather vague (ibid.). Nevertheless, it is a crucial characteristic that encompasses a 
CPE. 
Regarding to the third category, the way an actor uses its means to achieve its 
objectives, Smith draws on Nye’s concept of ‘soft power’ (K. Smith: 4). ‘Soft 
power’ means the power of attraction, which is the opposite of ‘hard’ or 
‘command power’ (means of coercion and inducement in international politics). 
In this sense, a ‘soft power’ co-opts rather than coerces other actors to “obtain the 
outcomes it wants in world politics” (Nye cited in ibid.). Other states admire the 
‘soft power’s’ values and status of prosperity and openness, and therewith try to 
emulate its example. However, this does not mean that a Civilian Power which is 
solely in possession of soft instruments uses these instruments exclusively in a 
persuasive manner. The concern here is that civilian/soft foreign policy tools like 
economic instruments (e.g. the promise of aid, sanctions etc.) can be used as 
‘carrots’, but also as ‘sticks’, since they might encompass coercive 
implementations for the recipient. The same with military means: On the one 
hand, forces can be used e.g. for invading another country, but on the other hand 
they can be used for training other troops or civil (peace-keeping) engagements. 
In this sense the label of a Civilian Power is not correct anymore when it uses 
coercion with civilian means. Furthermore, it is difficult to determine when 
coercion ends and persuasion begins. Smith especially stresses the case when the 
actor conducting the persuading or coercion is much more powerful than the 
target country. She clearly differentiates between the intention that might be 
persuasive and the actual action, than could be perceived as coercive by an 
outsider (Smith: 4, cf. 4.2). Consequently, in the here provided definition “civilian 
powers rely on soft power, on persuasion and attraction, not on coercion or carrots 
and sticks” (ibid). Whereas “coercion involves threatening or inflicting 
‘punishment’ as in the use of sanction” and “persuasion entails cooperating with 
third countries to try to induce desired internal or external policy changes” (Wein 
et. al. 2007: 147).  
The last point of this general definition is the abovementioned democratic 
control of the foreign-policy decision making process. This means a more “open 
diplomacy to encourage a more sophisticated public discussion of foreign policy 
matter” (Hill cited in K. Smith: 5). It is however hard to define what ‘democratic 
control’ or democratic legitimacy implies. Indeed, one can argue with the 
democratic deficits of the EU that the Union does not really fit in that scheme (cf. 
Wagner 2006). Nevertheless, the utilized definition here simply implies the 
democratic monitoring by member states, their parliaments, the European 
Parliament and public opinion (K. Smith 2005: 5). 
In conclusion, the here presented ideal type of Civilian Power synthesizes K. 
Smith’s “most radical vision of the »ideal type« of civilian power” (Louis 2007: 
9) with a feature of Maull’s ‘realist’ definition, namely the possibility for a 
civilian power to possess military force and to exert this force under very 
restricted conditions. So, by combining the four elements suggested by K. Smith,  
 
“we can construct an (albeit approximate) ‘ideal type’: a civilian power is an actor which uses 
civilian means ([which includes military force under very restricted and multilateral 
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 conditions]) for persuasion, to pursue civilian ends, and whose foreign-policy making process 
is subject to democratic control or public scrutiny. All four elements are important.” (K. 
Smith: 5) 
 
The opposite of the ideal-type Civilian Power is the ideal-type Military Power. 
According to K. Smith (2005: 5-6), Military Power comprises “an actor which 
uses military means (exclusively, though admittedly this is difficult to envisage)”, 
exerts coercion to manipulate other actors, “unilaterally pursues ‘military or 
militarised ends’ (again, difficult to envisage this, but we might include here goals 
such as territorial conquest and acquisition of more military power)”, and finally, 
whose “foreign policy-making process is not democratic”.   
Since Björkdahl (2007: 2) remarks that “the conventional distinction between 
normative power and military power is simplistic and the complex relationship 
between these kinds of powers are more complex than often presented”, the paper 
tries to provide an admittedly still simplistic distinction, but attempted to take into 
account a certain intermingling of civilian and military means. Both ideal types, 
military and civilian power, build the background to asses whether the empirical 
findings presented in the following chapters can be assigned to a CPE. 
Furthermore, the ideal type of Civilian Power will help us to asses whether we can 
place the contemporary EU on one of these ‘poles’. On which position on a 
‘yardstick’ between Civilian Power and Military Power can we put the EU? This 
metaphorical tool may help us to asses what kind of power the EU constitutes. 
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 4 Analysis  
This part tries, by means of qualitative text analysis and survey data, to analyse 
whether the European Union constitutes as a certain kind of power, and if it does, 
what kind of power/role it ascribes itself (ego-part). The empirical expert-survey 
will serve as primary material to analyse the alter-part of the EU, that is how the 
Union’s role is perceived by the ‘Others’. Thus, this finally forms a complete role-
conception of the European Union, which helps us to answer the question which 
type of role/actorness ‘fits’ the EU? 
4.1 Ego-Part 
Even though there is an on-going debate on the character of European actorness, a 
large part of the academic literature assesses the external appearance of the EU as 
(even though partly incomplete) independent, distinct, and significant in the 
international field (Keisala 2004: 80-86; Elgström and Smith: 2-3; Mackenstein 
and Marsh: 247-253). In actual research, scholars of European foreign policy 
often point out that “there is (…) a strong sense of the EU being different from 
other international actors” due to its “post-Westphalian construct based on the 
voluntary pooling of national sovereignty and of its shared values (…)” 
(Mackenstein and Marsh: 250). Additionally, it is claimed that “ideational issues 
go to the core of the EU as an international actor” hence they “affect its structures, 
instruments and cohesion” (ibid: 257). To find out about this distinct role of the 
European Union - the uniqueness as a Civilian Power - we take a closer look at 
the construction and manifestation of CPE.  
The ego-part of the European Union’s role is supposed to be constructed and 
reflected by utterances of EU’s main representatives and constituted in official 
documents. In the self-description of the EU the model of CPE clearly shines 
through. Since the first steps in direction of a common foreign policy, the idea of 
a specific responsibility towards the outer world is manifested in EU-documents. 
European policy is always presented as to be affected by the idea of dialogue and 
balance with others (Dembinski: 4). Already at the beginning of the external 
policy approaches, the ‘Declaration on European Identity’ (DEI; Copenhagen, 14 
December 1973) expresses the Civilian Power content of the EU/EC’s external 
policy cooperation. Apart from the awareness that the European states “have 
overcome their past enmities and have decided that unity is a basic European 
necessity to ensure the survival of the civilization which they have in common” 
(DEI: Article I, 1), the document states that the “essential aim is to maintain 
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 peace” (ibid.: Article I, 8). In the section on relations to the world, however, the 
early idea of a CPE arises undoubtedly:  
 
The Nine [EU Member States] intend to play an active rôle in world affairs and thus to 
contribute, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, to 
ensuring that international relations have a more just basis; that the independence and equality 
of States are better preserved; that prosperity is more equitably shared; and that the security of 
each country is more effectively guaranteed. In pursuit of these objectives the Nine should 
progressively define common positions in the sphere of foreign policy. (ibid.: Article II, 9) 
 
This motive is also to be found in later documents and official agreements like the 
Treaty on European Union. The preamble affirms the implementation of a 
common foreign and security policy in order “to promote peace, security and 
progress in Europe and in the world” (TEU, Preamble). Clearly this excerpt is in 
line with our proposed definition of Civilian Power. Additionally, article F obliges 
the Union to the respect of Human Rights, whereas article J.1 adds the objectives 
to preserve peace and “to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, 
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”. The Maastricht Treaty 
furthermore underpins the promotion of civilian ends. Explicitly, the TEU 
mentions the promotion of international cooperation in this context. 
However, one could claim that since the establishment of an ESDP, which 
could evidently change the international role of the EU, the significance of both 
abovementioned documents is futile. But in fact, the emergence of the ESDP has 
been perfectly incorporated in the Union’s self-description (Dembinski: 5). Javier 
Solana, High Representative for the CFSP, argues that with help of the ESDP the 
EU is able to advance the EU’s “core objectives: the alleviation of poverty, the 
promotion of democracy and the rule of law, and the protection of human rights” 
(Solana 2000a). He points out that the military capabilities will allow the Union to 
make greater contributions “to the development of international stability and the 
preservation of peace and security” (ibid.). Conform to the idea of a CPE, Solana 
(2000b) states that the use of military force “will of course always be a measure of 
last resort”. After all, the European Union is “not in the business of deploying 
troops for the sake of it” (ibid.). 
The commitment to the vision of a CPE can be further observed in actual 
speeches of European Union’s stakeholders, and, significantly, in present 
documents. Even though we have seen that the idea of the self-perception of 
Europe as a Civilian Power at least dates back to the 1970s, the first and clearest 
articulation of Europe’s adoption of a unique civilian role in the international 
arena is a statement of former Commission President Romano Prodi. As he spoke 
to the European Parliament at the beginning of his presidency he made clear the 
status of the EU as a Civilian Power: “We must aim to become a global civil 
power at the service of sustainable global development” (Prodi 2000). The notion 
of CPE at different levels of the EU seems to have become almost something like 
a political myth. At least the abovementioned statements show clearly that the EU 
understands itself as a distinct actor compared to others. Indeed, European key-
actors incorporate the idea of CPE, which accelerates a shaping of the ego-part of 
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 an external European role-concept. One crucial indicator is the repeated 
appearance of the “civilian power” notion in speeches of the present 
Commissioner for European Enlargement Olli Rehn. For instance, he explicitly 
names the term and summarizes central elements of CPE in a statement on the 
political situation in Turkey: “The European Union is founded on the principles of 
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the 
rule of law, and the supremacy of democratic civilian power over the military” 
(Rehn 2007). The preference for no-coercive civilian means and ends, along with 
the deep trust of Europe being able to domesticate and spread its inner relations to 
the neighbourhood is depicted in a speech of Rehn on Europe’s next frontiers: “by 
extending the area of peace and stability, democracy and the rule of law, the EU 
has achieved far more through its gravitational pull than it could ever have done 
with a stick or a sword” (Rehn 2006). Solana (2005) argues the same way, but 
accentuates the persuasive manner of EU’s action and even its democratic 
character by utilizing the problematic recourse of a ‘will of the people of Europe’:  
 
“Many Europeans crave a role for the EU on the world stage as a peace promoter in order to 
banish the demons of Europe’s own conflict-ridden experience; they seek to extend beyond 
Europe’s borders the zone of peace and stability which the integration project has helped to 
achieve; and they believe that the EU can use its transformative power to persuade others to 
move from war to peace and to universalize its own norms and ethics” 
 
In the field of security policy that is considered to be a crucial factor assessing the 
model of CPE, the EU reveals its self-perception particularly in the European 
Security Strategy19 (2003; ESS). The title of the document already suggests its 
normative intention to shape “A Secure Europe in a Better World”. Even more 
revealing was the Commission’s communication that was proceeded by the 
strategy with the explicit title ‘The European Union and the United Nations: the 
choice for multilateralism’ (Louis 2007: 15). However, the ESS presents how the 
EU interprets world politics and its own role in international affairs and can be 
considered as an agenda for future policy activities. As main challenges, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organized crime, state 
failure and regional conflicts are described. The two strategic objectives can be 
identified as building security in Europe’s neighbourhood and promotion of an 
international order, which is based on effective multilateralism (ESS 2003). 
Significantly, the ESS addresses not only the immediate effect of those challenges 
instead it names also its complex causes and takes responsibility for them20. In 
general, the strategy illustrates how the Union perceives (future) threats and 
identifies interests, strategies and a proceeding of how to deal with security 
challenges (Wein et. al. 2007: 146).  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
19 Since the paper is also known as the ‘Solana doctrine’, statements of the High Representative of the CFSP will 
be simultaneously considered in this part of the analysis. 
20 This has been observed as an important difference to the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the US, which 
“does not explore the causes of […] threats, the causes, (…) are outside the US and the Western world” (Mitzen: 
282) 
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 In the introduction of the document, the reference to the past of the EU/EC 
clearly shows the goal of a domestication or civilisation of international relations 
with help of “the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy [that] has 
seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies” 
(ESS). The introduction leaves no doubt about the strictly civilian way of 
handling international crises: “European countries are committed to dealing 
peacefully with disputes and to co-operating through common institutions” (ESS). 
The CPE notion is also expressed in “Europe should be ready to share in the 
responsibility for global security and in building a better world” (ibid.). This 
statement implies that Europe is a power for the ‘good’ in the world, which 
altruistically aims to make the world to a better place. In fact, this goal seems to 
be overambitious and reveals inconsistencies (see below).  
Many scholars, however, find that the ESS is a “succinct, well-written 
description of the EU’s ‘role concept’ as a civilian force” (Maull 2005: 792, cf. 
Mitzen 2006). According to this argumentation, the paper, which was 
deliberatively produced, emphasizes cooperation and multilateralism, and thus is a 
backbone of the notion of CPE. The ESS does consequently “’leave no room for 
an alternative’ to multilateral action” (Mitzen 2006: 283). As objective, the ESS 
names the building of “the development of a stronger international society,” along 
with “well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international 
order”. 
Maull (2005: 793) “easily find[s] all the core elements of civilian power” in 
the strategy. He names amongst others the crucial element of “the commitment to 
a fundamental transformation of international relations and to the need to organize 
broad-based international cooperation”. Indeed, a passage in the ESS underpins 
his findings:  
 
The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading 
good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of 
power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of 
strengthening the international order. (ESS 2003) 
 
In accordance to this excerpt Maull (2005: 793) notices further features of a CPE 
such as a “belief in the ‘democratic peace’ theory; (…) support for broader 
international participation and sustainable development; and the promotion of the 
rule of law (…)”. These observed factors strengthen the assessment of the ESS 
and can be backed with primary material provided by speeches of The High 
Representative for the CFSP’s. The clearest statement in this context is provided 
in Solana’s speech with regard to the Charlemagne award ceremony 2007, where 
he declared: “There is a European way of doing things in the world, of tackling 
international problems through dialogue, cooperation and building bridges. By 
protecting the vulnerable, and speaking in the name of those who are forced into 
silence” (Solana 2007d). Once again, an explicit multilaterally negotiated use of 
force is apparently not intended. The use of civilian instruments is rather 
preferred. 
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 When it comes to the central and controversial element of the use of military 
power commentators observe that the “text says almost nothing about the use of 
force” (Dempsey 2003). He admits that the strategy “does little to relate concrete 
means to specific ends in given problem areas” and explains that this is due to 
“nature of the beast”, as the EU has “specific characteristics an actor” . Jennifer 
Mitzen, however, notices that military capabilities are solely mentioned in the 
context of post-conflict situations, but most striking “not as instruments for taking 
offensive action” (2006: 283). She also observes that the document restrains the 
term of pre-emption and rather replaces it with the notion of a ’culture of 
prevention’ to build post-conflict peace (ibid.). In this context, the possible use of 
military force in EU military operations is linked to the democratic constitution of 
the Union. Javier Solana argues that operations in other parts of the world are 
demanded by the citizens of Europe, making it to ‘democratically justified’ 
operations (Solana 2007b; Solana Karlspreis engl.). In addition, the 
implementation of the ‘Petersberg tasks’ and therewith the possibility to deploy 
armed forces, is assessed to be only one part of a broad set of instruments. Future 
challenges that might threaten the EU’s safety cannot “be tackled by purely 
military means. Each requires a mixture of Instruments“ (ESS). As Solana 
(2007c) puts it “More than other actors, the EU can bridge the worlds of 
diplomats, soldiers and development experts”. In short, the findings suggest that 
the European Union seems to take the role as a CPE (Whitman 2006: 103). 
But is the European Union self-perception really not reflecting the obvious 
efforts to develop itself to a militarily more capable actor? What about the recent 
(military) engagements in peace operations in the Western Balkans and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo? Is EU’s apparently attempt to combine “the post-
modern, civilian power for the 21st century with traditional 20th century, great 
power capabilities” (Björkdahl 2007: 1) addressed in the self-image? Now, that 
the European Union has “made a remarkable, even revolutionary” progress in the 
ESDP and is finally able to “play a role which matches its responsibilities” 
(Solana 2007c), the abovementioned questions become evident. Indeed, an often-
cited work of the Danish political scientist Henrik Larsen (2002) who examined 
the role of the EU from a discourse analytical perspective reveals two important 
discourses: The dominate discourse conceptualizes the contemporary Union as a 
Civilian Power and reproduces this notion. In the late 1990s, the dominant 
framework of meaning regarding to concrete international conflicts has always 
been related to EU’s possible contribution with economic and political means, 
even though great steps were made concerning the developments in the CFSP and 
ESPD (Larsen: 290). More recently, military means are presented as one “part of 
the Union’s joint instruments of conflict resolution and crisis management” 
(ibid.). Thus, civilian means, which are continuously “articulated together with 
the military ones” (ibid.) dominate, and hence, do not give military means a 
central importance. The striking feature of the dominant discourse, however, is 
that the EU constructs itself as a power, which also able to use means of coercion. 
Although persuasion remains essential, this development to “draw on its 
economic and political means to further its political goals” in a rather coercive 
manner consequently negates the European Union’s aspiration being a true CPE. 
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 However, Larsen notes that the actual dominant discourse is not a total break with 
the CPE notion, but constitutes a crack in “that the use of military means in 
relation to concrete crisis is now presented as an integral part of the EU foreign 
policy profile” (ibid.: 292). In this context, a result of the conducted survey is 
striking: the majority of EU-representatives perceive there to be a gap between the 
EU’s self-construction as a CPE and the actual reality (Appendix 2 (A2)). In other 
words, it could be possible that the observed inconsistencies in the CPE-
perception have sensitized EU-diplomats. Representing the strongest advocate of 
current EU foreign policy, the Office of the High Representative for the CFSP 
answered matching to the dominant discourse. From this perspective, the Union 
still constitutes a Civilian Power, emphasizing the use of persuasion but also 
applying coercive means. (Un-)Surprisingly, no gap between the self-conception 
as a CPE and reality is perceived. However, the positive answers according to the 
use coercion and the finding that the EU will gain influence through increasing 
military capacity, clearly indicate the abovementioned incoherence of CPE and 
hence point in the direction of the competing discourse.  
The competing discourse stresses how the Union’s use of military means is 
central to create a unique role-concept as a ‘more serious’ actor in international 
relations. Military means further EU’s prestige and enable the Union to acquire an 
international status that truly displays its character (Larsen: 290- 293). In this 
sense, it seems that the competing discourse furthers the idea of a Europe 
puissance, making Europe a challenge to the US-superpower. In fact, this 
discourse is displayed in actual speeches of Solana. He often speaks of the 
impressiveness of EU missions and stresses the growing willingness to deploy 
European forces to crises areas (Solana 2007c). Nobody should dismiss the 
Union’s European security and defence policy as “all talk and no action” (ibid.). 
The “’real world’ experiences give us [i.e. the EU] opportunities to integrate the 
‘lessons learned’ into our evolving defence and doctrine”. Note here that the 
expression ‘real world’ may reflect the criticism of American conservatives 
(namely Kagan’s Of Paradise and Power), stating that Europe is living in a 
‘Kantian Paradise’. 
The ESS can also be analysed from this perspective, challenging the general 
view that it displays a coherent picture of CPE (cf. Wein et. al. 2007). From this 
perspective, the European Union views itself as an imperfect power, on its way to 
become a coherent actor with a full scale of military capabilities. “A more capable 
Europe is within our grasp, though it will take time to realise our full potential” 
(ESS 2003). The question arises what this coherence in regard to military 
integration would mean. Wein et. al. (2007: 150) see a danger that the ESS could 
help “to fall back into the old game of balance of power”. In this context they 
mention the US that seems to disagree with the military development and a new 
willingness to weaken the NATO ties ‘by doing it alone’. Exemplary an ESS 
passage may be quoted which could encourage a Europe puissance: “Our aim 
should be effective and balanced [italics added, B.K.] partnership with the USA. 
This is an additional reason for the EU to further build up its capabilities and 
increase its coherence” (ESS 2003). Predominately is the notion of ‘action’ or 
‘activeness’, which aims at the readiness for pre-emptive action:  The earlier the 
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 better (Solana 2007c). This implies the apprehension that the EU gets early 
engaged where it should rather not just to send a signal to the world that it is 
capable. “An active and capable EU would make an impact on a global scale” 
(ESS 2003). Most evidently the Union says ‘goodbye’ to the CPE idea 
emphasizing that self-defence has to be rethought, since “our traditional concept 
of self-defence (…) was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the 
first line of defence will often be abroad” (ibid.). Clearly, this quotation also 
stresses the abovementioned ‘activeness’ and the importance to defend the EU’s 
common values with “early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention” 
(ibid.). In general, the strategy underpins an “increasingly aggressive approach to 
conduct foreign and security policy” (Wein et. al.: 151) and legitimizes the use of 
force. Another assumption can be made by claiming that the concept of CPE now 
is a notion that merely serves the purpose of political consolidation. However, 
Wein et. al. (ibid.) admit that civilian instruments are still dominant for crisis- and 
conflict solution.  
In conclusion, we have seen that the European Union is constructing itself and 
perceives itself as a unique, civilian actor in international relations. However, a 
competing discourse exists, identified by Larsen (2002), and its influence seems 
to increasingly gleam through. This is evident when one examines the ESS, but 
also the answers of the High Representative for the CFSP. The observed 
development underpin the assumption that the competing and the dominant 
discourse intermingle occasionally. This discourse implies features of the civilian 
EU pursuing the way of ‘soft imperialism’: The term means “»soft power applied 
in a hard way, that is an asymmetric form of dialogue or even the imposition or 
strategic use of norms and conditionalities enforced for reasons of self-interest 
rather than for the creation of a genuine (interregional dialogue«” (Hettne & 
Söderbaum in Wein et. al. 2006: 155)  Thus a new discourse could be emerging 
being constructed of elements of both current discourses. Nevertheless, the 
dominant discourse has not forfeited its influence and is still prevailing. Hence, 
the model of a CPE still determines the self-perception of EU but it sustained very 
serious damage.  
4.2 Alter-part 
Solana (2007d) seems to recognize that there is a “subtle link between identity 
and external policy” and he is “convinced that there is a direct connection 
between the way we define ourselves and our external behaviour”. The study will 
now take a look on how this behaviour is assessed by the ‘Other’. Is the 
abovementioned crooked picture of the EU as a Civilian Power reflected in their 
eyes? Do they deny that Europe displays a Civilian or Normative Power? By 
studying the alter-part of the EU’s role concept we will be able to gain knowledge 
of “how well those [i.e. CPE] intentions have been translated into observable 
action” (Chaban et. al. 2006:247). 
 24
 There are a lot of commentaries in the academic literature claiming that the 
European Union is perceived by other actors as a civilian ‘Mister Nice Guy’ in the 
international arena (Mackenstein & Marsh 2006; McCormick 2007). However, 
empirical evidence is missing. Nevertheless, a few exceptions can be found. One 
is Ortega (2004) who is the editor of a work about global views on the European 
Union. He concludes by stating that the new, civilian role does not pose any threat 
to other actors (cf. Solana 2007d). Obviously, the contributors21 of his paper 
acknowledge Europe’s civilian role, which implies the illustration of civilian ends 
and means (Ortega 2006: 119). Moreover, they do not see the EU becoming a 
Europe Puissance (ibid: 126-27).  
Another exception but with a broader empirical focus is a recent work of 
Chaban et. al.(2006: 252) who present results that the EU appears “less 
confrontational” in negotiations and thereby displays a “softer alternative” to the 
US. When the focus does not lie on negotiations but is power-related and country-
specific – the authors analyse the Asia-pacific region –, the ‘others’ perceive the 
EU mostly as an ‘economic power’. The EU is furthermore seen as an 
multilateralist actor ‘not using hard power’ and not likely to become a superpower 
(ibid.: 254-256). Sometimes Europe is observed as a ‘force for the good’ and a 
normative leader spreading its values (ibid.). In terms of military capabilities 
disagreements among parts of ‘the others’ are observable: one part refers to 
Europe as being militarily well prepared (according to the Bosnian conflict) and 
as “’gaining’ in military power” (ibid.: 255). The other part asserts that Europe 
will hardly become a military power.  
Since the mentioned works do not focus on CPE, they can only provide us 
with initial but limited information on the paper’s issue. Therefore, the empirical 
material gained from a survey related to CPE provides some useful data. 
First of all, there is an overlapping between the findings mentioned above and 
the survey’s results. In fact, the large part (N= 6) of recipients first-ranks the 
Union as an economic power, whereas solely diplomats from Ukraine perceive it 
dominantly as a normative power. This arguably reflects the economic weight and 
trading ties of the EU. Significantly, Civilian Power and normative power are 
ranked second (of five) when the respondents should label the EU’s kind of 
power. Military power and ‘military power in the making’ were far behind and 
ranked last, reflecting EU’s rather small capacity of military force. The majority 
further states that this lack of military restricts EU’s influence in world affairs – 
even though mainly to some extent. However, three of seven respondents perceive 
the inconsiderable military capacity as not constraining the Union’s influence. A 
vast majority (N= 5) further considers that an increased military capability will, at 
least to some extent, assist to increase the Union’s influence in the international 
arena. One could interpret this twofold: First, there is an understanding in the 
‘wider world’ of Europe’s increasing of military capacity. Second, there is 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
21 The work grasps views of eight representative authors from countries outside the EU, comprising Latin 
America, Africa, Asia, Oceania and Central America.  
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 apparently a predominant realist understanding of international relations, 
emphasizing the traditional, military factor of influence.  
Since the provided definition emphasizes that a CPE is restricted to use 
civilian means to pursue other actors, the ‘others’ were asked to asses the manner 
in which the EU seem to act in the international arena. At first sight, the findings 
are that the European Union acts according to the CPE definition since six of 
seven actors named that it rather acts in a persuasive manner (A2). Also, five of 
seven respondents pointed out that the EU does not act in a coercive manner (A2). 
Hence, one could argue that the Civilian Power self-image of the EU is 
prevailingly shared with regards to the way the Unions applies its means. 
However, by taking a closer look at the answers, it becomes clear that the 
perception of using dominately persuasive means is not uncritically shared. Of the 
six answers acknowledging that the EU acts in a persuasive manner, only one 
(Moldova) definitely states a ‘yes’, while the other five state-representatives 
answered that the persuasion is only perceived to ‘some extent’. Ukraine even 
denies that the EU is persuasive in its international behaviour. Another indicator 
that the ‘others’ have doubts about Europe’s civilian identity can be identified in 
two answers that view the EU as acting to ‘some extent’ coercive (A2). To study a 
convergence of the role-concept formed by others and the EU’s CPE role, the 
questions above were narrowed down to a more tangible question. Is the 
conditionality of the EU perceived as an instrument of persuasion or coercion 
(A2)? The background for this question forms the observation that the EU 
increasingly uses this instrument in its foreign policy. Larsen (2002: 285) 
emphasizes that since the 1990s this foreign policy tool is applied mainly in 
relation to trade agreements and cooperation. Apparently, the focus is mainly on 
positive incentives, eschewing negative incentives. In this sense the EU uses 
“carrots rather than sticks” (ibid.). This also perceived by half of the outer-EU 
stakeholders. However, the other part perceives conditionality more differentiated 
as ‘both persuasion and coercion’, leaving room for interpretation where and to 
what extent the persuasion or coercion is sensed most.  
Since a CPE is supposed to be shaping milieu goals rather than possession 
goals (cf. 3.), no indication should be measurable that the European Union is 
pursuing its very self-interest. The survey, however, provides us with information, 
which can be interpreted that the EU is actually pursuing possession goals. Hence, 
the majority (N=3, one abstain from deciding) of ‘others’ clearly answered ‘yes’ 
whether the Union is pursuing its self-interests through their operations. Two 
diplomats, differentiating more, answered the same question with ‘to some 
extent’. Only the representative of Sudan negated the question. Nevertheless, 
these answers do not explicitly indicate that the EU aims to pursue possession 
goals. To be sure which of the two interest types are pursued by the Union, a 
further question tackling this would have been suitable. However, with the limited 
information available, the milieu goal implication of a CPE is questionable when 
it is compared to perception of ‘outsiders’. Additionally, the results of the EU-
delegations (A2) show that even the EU perceives itself to further self-interests 
with its military and civilian operations. Three of four EU-respondents (also the 
‘Solana office’) answered that the Union is (at least to some extent) pursuing its 
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 self-interest, while only one EU-diplomat (from the Delegation to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo) answered ‘no’. To some extent an affirmation of question ten 
(A2) supports this assumption, since an aggressive pursuance of national (or self) 
interests probably provokes a dismissive stance towards this policy. However, 
only three respondents answered that the Union is to some extent engaged where 
it should rather not.  
Finally, it became obvious that the current (self-constructed and reproduced) 
picture of the EU as a Civilian Power is not shared without doubts among most 
‘others’ (ibid.). The majority of foreign actors clearly see a gap between the EU’s 
self-description as a CPE and the reality. While two respondents find that the 
CPE-picture is only partly congruent with international relations reality, only the 
Georgian respondent does not see this. This result contains two important 
implications: First, it shows that there is apparently a development towards a ‘less 
civilian power’ appearance in the international arena. Especially when put 
together with the results of Question 7 and 6 (ibid.), the perception of ‘others’ 
point towards a more coercive international actor. The second implication is that 
the EU clearly walks a tightrope, since the own perception, displayed by the 
survey-result of the High Representative for the CFSP, confirm the self-
perception as a CPE. The ‘other’, however, experiences this self-perception 
differently.  
In sum, the alter-part, thus expectations of the ‘other’, constructs the 
European Union not as an ideal-type civilian power. The Union is rather 
perceived as a traditional actor which has persuasive and coercive instruments at 
its disposal and is keen on using both, but generally prefers to persuade other 
actors. The image of a ‘power of good’ described by the literature, however, is not 
reflected in the results. In this sense, the Union is not a hard military power, but is 
perceived as an economic power punching its weight to pursue its self-interests. 
The perception depicted in C4 could be summarized as a civilian power at 
crossroads, on its way towards a harder approach in international issues. 
Somehow there are also contradictions to be found when analysing the replies of 
the survey: on the one hand, some respondents highly rank the EU (first or 
second) being a normative/ civilian power, but on the other they perceive there to 
be a gap between its behaviour in reality and ascribe coercive behaviour to it. 
Furthermore, the question arises how this ‘gap’ between the labels of civilian 
power and something else are constituted? Only more empirical research will be 
able to resolve these questions. Yet, the alter-part of the role-conception 
constitutes a challenge to the self-perception of the EU and a (new) classification 
of EU’s external appearance. 
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 5 Conclusion 
In this work the author introduced an own definition of CPE based on K.Smith’s 
and Maull’s knowledge. Combining this definition with the background of CPE 
notion the work’s attempt was to show whether the current developments in the 
European foreign Policy, mainly the increasing willingness to use hard power, 
may have altered the conception of Europe as a Civilian Power.  
Indeed, there are strong indications that the EU currently tries to couple its 
‘soft’ power with ‘hard’ power. The consequences have been examined in both 
the conception of an ego and an alter-part of a role-conception. With help of a 
theoretical and methodological framework adopting role-theory, the study 
concludes with a two-fold finding in each role-conceptualization part.  
The insight provided by the self-conception of the EU to large extent show 
that it is still constructed as a Civilian Power. Evidence for this has been shown in 
the analysis of the ESS, stakeholder speeches and other material. Despite the 
changes in the CFSP, the Union’s self-understanding is to large parts still based 
on the values and norms anchored in the analysed material. The dominant 
discourse of the EU being a civilian power is uncritically reproduced in speeches 
of EU-policymakers, but also in the media. “The ‘European way’ of doing things 
in foreign policy” (Solana 2007d), according to this discourse, is displayed as the 
peaceful and unique way of civilizing international relations.  
However, the study could also highlight support of the thesis that the EU 
external appearance is not any longer similar to the picture of a civilian power. 
The rhetoric of a more capable Europe along with the developments of the 
CFSP/ESDP and the “much greater use of political conditionality “ (Mackenstein 
and Marsh 2005: 258) are serious indicators for an altered self-perception. 
Consequently, an existing competing discourse, emphasizing the military and 
coercive ‘side’ of Europe, seems to develop rapidly and mixes up with the 
dominant one at the same time. Thus, a new ‘soft imperialistic’ discourse is 
probably evolving, constructed with help of the abovementioned coupling of both 
hard and soft means. In other words, it could be argued that “the EU is beginning 
to change its character as an international actor” (ibid). 
The investigation of the alter-part indicates that the ‘others’ perceive the 
general self-understanding of the EU as a CPE differently. The perception of non-
EU international players forms a role-conception of the EU that rather matches 
with the developing ‘soft imperialism’ discourse, but is not congruent to that term. 
In their eyes, the Union is an important economic actor that is willingly to apply 
harder approaches in the international arena. The increasing coercive incentives of 
conditionality and the perceived self-interest build the basis for this observation. 
At the same time, the ‘others’ seem to understand the developments in the ESDP. 
The majority acknowledges the military evolvements since they restrict the 
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 Union’s influence. A stronger ESDP would, according to the results, lead to a 
greater influence of the EU in the world. In general, ‘outsiders’ realize that the EU 
is not a ‘coercive force’ or military power per se. They see the Union’s external 
behaviour more persuasive than coercive.  
However, the survey-results illustrate that within this perception an 
uncertainty can be identified: the assessment of the Union as an economic or 
civilian power is shared by all respondents. At the same time, they observe a rift 
between the European Union’s self-conception as a civilian power and its real 
behaviour in the international arena. According to this, the alter-part is 
ambivalent and therefore a clear statement that indicates what kind of power the 
Union represents in the eyes of others is finally hard to make.  
When comparing the findings of alter- and ego-part, it becomes clear that 
there is a gap between the EU’s self-construction as a CPE and the role perceived 
by the ‘others’. Thus, the role-conception’s ego-part is not conform to its alter-
part. However, since the ambiguity within both role-parts was empirically 
observed in both parts, an assessment of a complete role-conception of the 
contemporary EU is difficult to comprehend. 
Thus to conclude, the from the findings in both ego and alter-part, it can be 
argued that the labelling of the EU as a CPE will not match anymore. The corset 
of CPE is not fitting anymore due to the growing ‘military and coercive weight’ of 
the EU and the assessment of the tailor (‘other’), who tends not to recommend this 
piece of clothing. The study therefore argues for a new conceptualization of the 
EU, which encompasses these findings. One possibility doing so is utilizing the 
‘yardstick’ metaphor, which implies the measurable space of the two ideal-types 
of civilian and military power. In this aspect, the civilian power of Europe is 
measurably moving towards the other pole, but is still far away from it. More 
insights on this can be achieved through further empirical research comprising 
interview methods.   
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 7 Appendix 
A1: The original survey 
 
All answers should be related to your experiences (as a representative of your country) 
how the European Union acts in relations to your country, respectively how you perceive 
the EU. 
 
Please click on a box (  ) to mark your answer. Also note that you have only ONE 
answer-possibility for each question. If there are other possibilities it will be indicated. 
 
 
1.) In sum, do you perceive the EU’s engagement in your country to have been successful? 
 
  yes 
  to some extent 
  no 
  I don’t know 
 
 
2.) Would you say that the EU acts in a persuasive manner in the international arena?  
  
  yes 
  to some extent 
  no 
  I don’t know 
 
If you have answered yes, please state what kind of persuasion you have experienced: 
You can type your answer here in the grey box. 
 
 
 
3.) Would you say that the EU acts in a coercive manner in the international arena? 
 
 yes 
 to some extent 
 no 
 I don’t know 
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 If you have answered yes, please state what kind of coercion you have experienced: 
You can type your answer here in the grey box. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.) Do you perceive there to be a gap between the EU’s perception of itself as a civil power in 
international relations and its actual behaviour?  
 
  yes 
  to some extent 
  no 
  I don’t know 
 
 
5.) What kind of power characterizes the EU best? Rank them from 1-5, where 1 is the term 
best describing the EU in world affairs. (Use the dropdown element by clicking on the figure) 
 
   1    Civilian Power  
   1      Normative Power  
   1    Military Power in the making 
   1      Military Power 
   1      Economic Power 
 
 
6.) Would you characterize the conditionality of the EU (i.e. how the EU conditions its aid, 
trade and development assistance) as an instrument of persuasion or coercion? 
 
  persuasion 
  coercion 
  both coercion and persuasion 
  neither coercion nor persuasion 
  I don’t know 
 
 
7.) Do you hold the opinion that the EU is pursuing its self-interests through its presence in 
your country?  
 
  yes 
  to a certain extent 
  no 
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   I have no opinion 
 
 
8.) In your opinion, do you perceive the EU’s limited military capacity to restrict the EU’s 
influence in world affairs?  
 
  yes 
  to a certain extent 
  no 
  I don’t know 
 
9.) Do you think that the development of a European military capability will assist the EU in 
increasing its influence in the international arena?  
 
  yes 
  to a certain extent 
  no 
  I don’t know 
 
 
10.) Do you perceive the EU to intervene in matters where it should rather not?  
 
  yes 
  to a certain extent 
  no 
  I don’t know 
 
If you answered ‘yes’ or ‘to a certain extent’, can you please state one or more examples of 
such EU engagement?  
You can type your answer here in the grey box. 
 
 
 
 
11.) Which of the European states do you perceive to set the EU foreign policy agenda and 
dominate EU’s external actions? 
You can type your answer here in the grey box 
 
 
Now, please be so kind to save this document and send it back. 
 
Thank you very much for your time and cooperation! 
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 A2: The aggregated replies to the survey  
 
    
    
 
High Representative 
Solana EU' (N=4)
Others' 
(N=7)  
    
    
    
Question 1: In sum, do you perceive the EU’s engagement 
in your country to have been successful?    
yes  3 2
to some extent 1 1 5
no    
don't know    
    
Question 2: acts the EU persuasive in the international 
arena?     
yes 1 1 1
to some extent  3 5
no   1
don't know    
    
Question 3: acts the EU coercive in the international 
arena?    
yes x   
to some extent   2
no x 4 5
I don't know    
    
Q 4: Do you perceive there to be a gap between CPE and 
reality?    
yes  1 3
to some extent  2 2
no 1 1 1
I don't know   1
    
Q 5: What kind of Power characterizes the EU most ? 
(most high placed)    
Normative   1
Civilian 1 1  
Military Power in making    
Military Power    
Economic Power  3 6
    
Q 6: Is the instrument of conditionality rather persuasion or 
coercion?    
Persuauion 1 2 3
Coercion    
both coercion and persuasion  1 3
neither coercion nor persuasion  1 1
I don't know    
    
Q 7: Do you hold the opinion that the EU is pursuing its 
self-interests through its presence in your country?     
yes  1 3
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 to some extent 1 2 2
no  1 1
don't know   1
    
Q 8: Military capacity restricts EU influence?    
yes 1 1 1
to some extent  2 3
no   3
I don't know  1  
    
Q 9: Military capability increases EU influence in the 
World?    
yes 1 2 1
to some extent  1 4
no   2
I don't know  1  
    
Q 10: EU intervenes in matters where it should rather not?    
yes    
to some extent   3
no 1 4 4
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